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Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) is a paradigm that provides data on demand to consumers
across different cloud platforms over the Internet. Yet, a single DaaS provider may not be
able to fulﬁll a data request. Consequently, the concept of DaaS mashup was introduced to
enable DaaS providers to dynamically integrate their data on demand depending on con-
sumers’ requests. Utilizing DaaS mashup, however, involves some challenges. Mashing
up data from multiple sources to answer a consumer’s request might reveal sensitive in-
formation and thereby compromise the privacy of individuals. Moreover, data integration
of arbitrary DaaS providers might not always be sufﬁcient to answer incoming requests.
In this thesis, we provide a cloud-based framework for privacy-preserving DaaS mashup
that enables secure collaboration between DaaS providers for the purpose of generating an
anonymous dataset to support data mining. We propose a greedy algorithm to determine
a suitable group of DaaS providers whose data can satisfy a given request. Furthermore,
our framework securely integrates the data from multiple DaaS providers while preserving
the privacy of the resulting mashup data. Experiments on real-life data demonstrate that
our DaaS mashup framework is scalable to large set of databases and it can efﬁciently and
iii
effectively satisfy the data privacy and data mining requirements speciﬁed by the DaaS
providers and the data consumers.
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Mashup is a web technology that integrates information from multiple web applications
into a new web application. For instance, Trendsmap.com1 is a website that integrates
the data from Twitter and Google Maps. It displays the map of cities all over the world
on Google Maps with the most tweeted subjects from Twitter. Data mashup is a special
kind of mashup application for integrating information of multiple data providers based on
consumers’ requests. Data mashup is applicable for different purposes, such as managing
scientiﬁc research [But06] and addressing enterprises’ business needs [Jhi06].
Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) is an emerging cloud computing service that provides data
on demand to consumers across various cloud platforms via different network protocols
over the Internet. Utilizing DaaS not only supports data access from anywhere at anytime
but also reduces the cost of data management. We foresee that a new class of integration
technologies will emerge to serve data integration on demand using DaaS providers through
web services, and we call it DaaS Mashup.
In this thesis, we propose a privacy-preserving DaaS mashup framework that allows
DaaS providers to securely integrate and trade their collected person-speciﬁc survey data
1http://www.trendsmap.com/
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to support data mining. In the market, DaaS providers can register and advertise their avail-
able data, and data consumers can submit their data mining requests, such as classiﬁcation
analysis with a minimum accuracy requirement. Then a mashup coordinator in the frame-
work dynamically determines the group of DaaS providers whose data can fulﬁll the data
mining request, with the consideration of data availability, bid price, and data quality, such
as classiﬁcation accuracy. The challenges of constructing a market for sharing survey data
are summarized as follows:
Challenge #1: Privacy concerns. DaaS providers are often reluctant to share the
person-speciﬁc data of their survey respondents because of data privacy. Many organi-
zations and companies believe that removing explicit identifying information, such as a
respondents’ name and SSN, from the released data is sufﬁcient for privacy protection.
Yet, substantial research works [Swe02a] [Sam01] demonstrate that this naive approach is
insufﬁcient because a respondent can be re-identiﬁed by simple linkage attacks on other
attributes called quasi-identiﬁers (QID). Two types of privacy concerns have to be ad-
dressed in our proposed DaaS mashup framework. First, the ﬁnal mashup data has to be
anonymized in order to disable any potential linkage attacks. Second, during the mashup
process, no DaaS provider should learn more information from the other DaaS providers
other than that is revealed in the ﬁnal mashup data.
Challenge #2: Data quality concerns. Protecting privacy is important. Yet, it is
also equally important to ensure that the ﬁnal mashup data contributed by multiple DaaS
providers is useful for a given consumer’s data request. A data request can range from a
simple data query to a complex data mining request. The challenge is how to ensure that
the data quality of the ﬁnal anonymized mashup data meets the data request.
Challenge #3: Matching data requests. Every registered DaaS provider owns differ-
ent data attributes, imposes different levels of privacy protection, and advertises their data
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with different prices. Data coming from a single DaaS provider may not be sufﬁcient to ful-
ﬁll a data request; subsequently, selecting the appropriate combination of DaaS providers
is a non-trivial task. The selection process has to consider the consumer’s data attribute
requirement, data quality requirement, and bid price as well as the DaaS providers’ privacy
requirements.
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
Contribution #1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that proposes a
cloud-based DaaS framework to integrate private data from multiple DaaS providers with
the goal of preserving both data privacy and the data mining quality of the underlying data.
Section 3 provides a formal description of the objectives and behaviour of the participants
in the proposed framework.
Contribution #2. Vaculin et al. [VHNS08] presented a web service framework to an-
swer a request coming from a consumer with the assumption that a single provider can
fulﬁll the request. In contrast, we remove such an assumption and dynamically identify the
combination of DaaS providers whose data can best satisfy the data privacy, data quality,
and price requirements. If no providers can fulﬁll the request with the offered price, alterna-
tive solutions with a higher price or lower data quality requirements will be recommended.
Section 4 presents the proposed framework and algorithms.
Contribution #3. We performed experimental evaluation on real-life data to measure
the impact of the DaaS providers’ revenue, the efﬁciency, and scalability of our proposed
market framework with respect to different privacy levels. Extensive experimental results
suggest that our framework is efﬁcient in terms of processing various sizes of queries with
regard to data quality and bid price. Section 5 shows the experimental results.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the preliminaries
together with related works. Chapter 3 describes the participants of our framework and
provides the formal deﬁnition for our DaaS mashup framework. Chapter 4 illustrates our
3
proposed solution. Comprehensive experimental results are presented in Chapter 5. Finally,




In this chapter, we review the preliminary constructs that are required to understand the
research problem and solution discussed in the subsequent chapters. Next, we review the
literature in the related research areas.
2.1 Preliminaries
In privacy-preserving data publishing, choosing the appropriate privacy model and anonymiza-
tion techniques are important issues. When a data provider publishes nothing, data privacy
is maximized, whereas privacy protection can not be guaranteed when a data provider re-
leases raw data without anonymization. Consequently, it is essential for a data provider to
employ a proper data privacy model and an anonymization mechanism. In this section, we
discuss different privacy models and anonymization techniques.
The scenario presented in this thesis involves multiple DaaS providers in a cloud en-
vironment. Thus, we will study a speciﬁc data mashup algorithm that is designed for
performing privacy-preserving data mashup on high-dimensional data [FTH+12]. Further-
more, we will discuss the concept of Platform-as-a-Service in cloud computing [MG11].
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2.1.1 Privacy Models
In 1977 Dalenius [Dal77] provided a very stringent deﬁnition for privacy protection: "Ac-
cess to the published data should not enable the attacker to learn anything extra about any
target victim compared to no access to the database, even with the presence of any at-
tacker’s background knowledge obtained from other sources." Dwork [Dwo06], in 2006,
showed it is impossible to claim such an absolute privacy protection due to the presence
of an attacker’s background knowledge. Suppose the job of an individual is sensitive in-
formation. Assume an attacker knows that Bob’s job is a professional job. If an attacker
has access to a statistical database that discloses the professional jobs, then according to
Dalenius [Dal77], Bob’s privacy is compromised, regardless of whether or not his record
is in the database [Dwo06]. Consequently, an attacker having background knowledge can
perform various kinds of privacy attacks. Accordingly, different kinds of privacy models
have been proposed to address this issue.
In the most basic form of privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), the data pub-
lisher’s table has a form of:
D(Explicit_Identifier,Quasi_Identifier, Sensitive_Attributes,Non−
sensitive_Attributes),
where Explicit_Identifier is a set of attributes that explicitly identify an individual,
such as SSN and name. These attributes must be removed before publishing the data.
Quasi_Identifier (QID) is a set of attributes whose combined value may potentially iden-
tify an individual. For example, the combination of gender, native-country, and job. The
values of these attributes may be available publicly from other sources. Sensitive_Attributes
contain sensitive person-speciﬁc information, and an adversary is not permitted to link their
values with an identiﬁer. Examples are disease, salary, etc. Non − sensitive_Attributes
consist of all attributes that do not fall into the previous three categories [BBSPA03]. Based
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on quasi-identiﬁers, an attacker may still be able to perform different types of privacy at-
tacks. We explain the most common linkage attacks below.
Record linkage attack. In this attack, a small number of records in the released data
table T , named a group, can be identiﬁed by some value qid on QID. If the target vic-
tim’sQID matches the value qid, then the target victim is vulnerable to being linked to the
group. In this case, an adversary needs to use background knowledge to be able to identify
the victim’s record from the group.
Job Sex Age Salary
Writer Male 25 50K
Writer Male 21 50K
Dancer Male 27 35K
Dancer Male 25 30K
Engineer Female 38 50K
Doctor Female 30 45K
Doctor Female 30 45K
Table 1: Raw Employee Data
Example 1. Suppose an organization wants to publish an employee’s record in Table 1 to
a research center. If an adversary knows there is a record in the table that belongs to Bob, a
male writer who is 21 years old, he can deduce that Bob has a salary of 50K dollars because
there is only one record with qid =< Writer,Male, 21 > in the table.
Attribute linkage attack. This attack is not similar to record linkage attack as an adversary
may not need to exactly identify the record of a target victim V . In an attribute linkage
attack, an adversary could infer some sensitive information about V based on the set of
sensitive attributes associated with the group to which V belongs. In other words, he wants
to utilize background knowledge of the victim’s qid to infer sensitive values with a certain
degree of conﬁdence. This attack is effective if the conﬁdence, calculated by P (s|qid) =
7
|T [qid∧s]|
|T [qid]| , is high, i.e., |T [qid]|, the number of records in T containing qid, is small.
Name Job Sex Age
Bob Writer Male 21
Cathy Doctor Female 30
Peter Writer Male 25
Alice Doctor Female 30
John Writer Male 29
Henry Dancer Male 27
Renee Engineer Female 38
Bob Dancer Male 25
Linda Doctor Female 31
Table 2: External Data Table
Example 2. Following Table 1, the adversary can infer that all female doctors at age 30
have the sensitive attribute salary 45K. Applying this information to Table 2, an adversary
can infer that Alice has an income of 45K with 100% conﬁdence, provided she comes from
the same population in Table 1. This example shows an effective attack because the number
of records in Table 2 containing qid =< Doctor, Female, 30 > is small.
In general, different privacy models have been proposed to prevent an adversary linking
to an individual with sensitive information, given the knowledge of the quasi-identiﬁer at-
tributes. In this section, we discuss four different privacy models: K-anonymity [Sam01] [Swe02b],
-Diversity [MKGV07], Conﬁdence Bounding [WFY07], and LKC-Privacy [MFHL09].
K-Anonymity
The notion of K-anonymity, ﬁrst proposed by Samarati and Sweeney [Sam01] [Swe02b],
is to prevent a record linkage attack through QID. K-anonymity declares the minimum
group size on QID in a table is K, and a table satisfying this requirement is called K-
anonymous. In aK-anonymous table, the probability of linking a victim to a certain record
through QID is at most 1/K because it is indistinguishable for an adversary to identify a
record from at least k − 1 other records with respect to QID.
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Job Sex Age Salary
Artist Male [20-30) >40K
Artist Male [20-30) >40K
Artist Male [20-30) <40K
Artist Male [20-30) <40K
Professional Female [30-40) >40K
Professional Female [30-40) >40K
Professional Female [30-40) >40K




Artistrti t Professionalr f i l






[30-40)[ - )[20-30)[ - )
[30-35)[ - ) [35-40)[ - )
Figure 1: Taxonomy Trees for Job, Age, Sex
Example 3. Table 3 shows a 3-anonymous table; each group of distinct QID groups,
< Artist,Male, [20, 30) > and < Professional, Female, [30, 40) >, contains at least
3 records. This table generalizes QID = {Job, Sex,Age} from Table 1 using taxonomy
trees in Figure 1.
-Diversity
Machanavajjhala et al. [MKGV07] proposed a -diversity privacy model to prevent attribute
linkage attacks and pointed out that the K-anonymity model cannot prevent such attacks.
The -diversity model needed every qid group to contain at least  "well-represented" sen-
sitive values. The notion of "well-represented" has different interpretations, which some
instantiations represented in [MKGV07]. The simplest one is to ensure that the sensitive
attribute has at least  distinct values in each qid group.
Example 4. Table 4 shows a 2-diverse table, in which each qid group contains at least two
distinct values. Thus, even if an adversary ﬁgures out the qid group containing the record
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Artist Male [20-30) >40K
Artist Male [20-30) >40K
Artist Male [20-30) <40K
Artist Male [20-30) <40K
Professional Female [30-40) >40K
Professional Female [30-40) >40K
Professional Female [30-40) >40K
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Example 3. Table 3 shows a 3-anonymous table; each group of distinct QID groups,
< Artist,Male, [20, 30) > and < Professional, Female, [30, 40) >, contains at least
3 records. This table generalizes QID = {Job, Sex,Age} from Table 1 using taxonomy
trees in Figure 1.
-Diversity
Machanavajjhala et al. [MKGV07] proposed a -diversity privacy model to prevent attribute
linkage attacks and pointed out that the K-anonymity model cannot prevent such attacks.
The -diversity model needed every qid group to contain at least  "well-represented" sen-
sitive values. The notion of "well-represented" has different interpretations, which some
instantiations represented in [MKGV07]. The simplest one is to ensure that the sensitive
attribute has at least  distinct values in each qid group.
Example 4. Table 4 shows a 2-diverse table, in which each qid group contains at least two
distinct values. Thus, even if an adversary ﬁgures out the qid group containing the record
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Job Sex Age Salary
Writer Male * 50K
Writer Male * 50K
Writer Male * 35K
* Female 25 30K
* Female 25 30k
* Female 25 45K
Doctor * 38 70k
Doctor * 38 70k
Doctor * 38 40k
Table 4: 2-Diverse Data table
of an individual, he can determine the real sensitive value of the individual with no more
than 50% conﬁdence.
Conﬁdence Bounding
Wang et al. [WFY07] presented an alternative privacy model, Conﬁdence Bounding, to
prevent attribute linkage attacks. They considered bounding the conﬁdence of inferring
a sensitive value from a qid group by determining one or more privacy templates of the
form < QID → s, h >, where QID is a quasi-identiﬁer, s is a sensitive value, and h is a
threshold.
Example 5. Consider QID = Job, Sex,Age, < QID →> 40K, 20% >, which states
the conﬁdence of inferring someone’s salary >40K from any group on qid is no more than
20%. Table 3 shows this privacy template is violated because the conﬁdence of inferring a
salary >40K is 50% in the group < Artist,Male, [20− 30) >.
LKC-Privacy
Many privacy models such as K-anonymity [Swe02a] [Sam01] [Swe02b] and its exten-
sions [LDR06a] [MKGV07] [XT06] have been proposed in the last decade to thwart record
and attribute linkage attacks in the context of relational databases. LKC-privacy [MFHL09]
was speciﬁcally designed for preventing linkage attacks on high-dimensional data, i.e., data
with a large number of attributes. A data mining request can be complicated and requires
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many attributes from different data providers, often resulting in a high-dimensional inte-
grated table. Extensive experimental results [MFHL09] have shown that enforcing other
traditional privacy models would result in poor data mining quality in the anonymized data.
The general intuition of LKC-privacy is to ensure that every qid with a maximum
length L in the data table T is to be shared by at least a certain number of records K.
The conﬁdence of inferring any sensitive values in S is at most C, where L,K,C are
data provider-speciﬁed privacy thresholds, and S is a set of sensitive values determined by
the data providers. The LKC-privacy model bounds the probability of a successful record
linkage attack to be ≤ 1/K and the probability of a successful attribute linkage attack to
be ≤ C, provided an adversary’s prior knowledge does not exceed L.
LKC-privacy generalizes several traditional privacy models. K-anonymity [Swe02a]
[Sam01] [Swe02b] is a special case of LKC-privacy if L = |QID| and C = 100%, where
|QID| is the number ofQID attributes in the data table T . Conﬁdence bounding [WFY07]
is also a special case of LKC-privacy if L = |QID| and K = 1. Consequently, traditional
models are available for data providers, if needed.
2.1.2 Anonymization Techniques
In order to achieve the privacy models, anonymization techniques must be applied to the
raw data to make them less precise. There may be more than one anonymization tech-
nique usable to achieve a privacy model, and choosing the right technique leads to a better
trade-off between data privacy and utility. In the following we present some widely used
techniques often used for anonymization.
Suppression
The simplest anonymization technique is suppression. It is achieved by replacing (sup-
pressing) an attribute value of a cell with a special symbol e.g., "*", or "Any." For example,
11
Job Sex Age Salary
Artist Male [20-30) >40K
Artist Male [20-30) >40K
Artist Male [20-30) <40K
Artist Male [20-30) <40K
Professional Female * >40K
Professional Female * >40K
Professional Female * >40K
Table 5: 3-Anonymous Employee Data by Suppression
in Table 5 certain values of the Age attribute are suppressed to ensure 3-anonymity.
There are different schemes for suppression: Record suppression [BA05] [Iye02] [LDR05] [Sam01],
Value suppression [WFY05] [WFY07], andCell suppression (or local suppression) [Cox80]
[MW04], which respectively refer to suppressing an entire record, suppressing every in-
stance of a given value in a table, and suppressing some instances of a given value in a
table.
Generalization
Generalization provides better data utility than suppression because it replaces the attribute
values by more general values using taxonomy trees. Generalization uses some interme-
diate states according to the given taxonomy tree to anonymize a table. For a categorical
attribute, a speciﬁc value can be replaced with a general one and for a numerical attribute,
an interval covering the exact values can be used. Table 3 shows 3-anonymous data by
generalization using Figure 1 as a taxonomy tree. For instance, it shows the values Writer
and Dancer, for the categorical attribute Job, replaced by a more general value, Artist; the
value 25, for numerical attribute Age, is replaced by an interval [20,30), according to the
taxonomy tree.
Generalization techniques have two main categories: global and local generalization
[LDR05]. Global generalization refers to mapping all instances of a value to the same




Bucketization [XT06] [MKM+07] is the notion of dividing all the records into several
buckets in such a way that each bucket identiﬁes by an ID. Bucket IDs are stored, along
with encrypted data, on the server. There are two general bucketization methods to se-
lect the bucket ranges: equi-width and equi-depth. Equi-width bucketization works well
with uniformly distributed data because each bucket is the same size. However, equi-depth
bucketization may be more suitable for non-uniformly distributed data because each bucket
has the same number of items.
Other anonymization techniques include a randomization-based approach and an output
perturbation-based approach. A randomization-based approach adds noise to the underly-
ing data if the attributes are numerical attributes and replaces the values with other values
from the domain for the categorical attributes [AS00] [EGS03]. Randomization-based ap-
proach is useful if the applications need to preserve data truthfulness at the aggregated level,
but not at the record level. On the other hand, the output perturbation-based approach ﬁrst
computes the correct result and then adds noise in order to output the perturbed result.
2.1.3 Privacy-Preserving High-Dimensional DataMashup (PHDMashup)
Data Mashup is a technology used to integrate data from multiple providers based on a
user’s request. Integrating data from multiple sources always brings some challenges.
First, integrating multiple private data sets from different data providers without using any
privacy models and anonymization techniques would reveal sensitive information to the
other data providers. Moreover, the mashup data might reveal some sensitive information
that was not available before the mashup. Utilizing a traditional privacy model such as
K-anonymity on the raw data would result in the curse of high dimensionality problem
[Agg05]; the high-dimensional data could result in useless data for various data analyses.
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Consider D = {P1, . . . , Pm} be a set of data providers, where each provider Pi ∈
D : 1 ≤ i ≤ m owns a person-speciﬁc data table Ti. The target attribute Class for
classiﬁcation analysis is shared among all tables. Privacy-Preserving High-Dimensional
Data Mashup (PHDMashup) [FTH+12] is a secure protocol that addresses all the afore-
mentioned challenges and generates a mashup table that fulﬁlls a speciﬁed LKC-privacy
requirement while containing as much information as possible for simple or complex data
analysis. During the integration process each data provider learns nothing about the other
provider’s data more than the data in the ﬁnal mashup table. In this thesis, PHDMashup
serves as the core data mashup protocol of our framework.
2.1.4 Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
PaaS is a class of cloud computing services that provide a computing platform-as-a-service
in the cloud. In this model, cloud providers offer a computing platform that includes oper-
ating systems, databases, and web servers. By subscribing to this service, consumers can
easily deploy applications in a cloud-based infrastructure without paying high costs that
include purchasing, maintaining, and conﬁguring hardware and the software required to
deploy applications. We require the PaaS model to have large-scale storage capabilities
and availability, reliability, and easy maintenance.
In this thesis we choose Microsoft Windows Azure because it supports all the afore-
mentioned properties in addition to our familiarity with Windows (ease of use), as well as
different pricing models. The Windows Azure Cloud Services are utilized to deploy the web
services of our framework in the cloud, and Microsoft SQL Azure is used to store the DaaS
providers’ databases in a distributed environment.
In a traditional on-premise application, both the database and the application code are
14
Figure 2: Windows Azure SQL Database Data Access
located in the same physical data center. The Windows Azure platform offers new alterna-
tives to that architecture. Figure 21 illustrates two scenarios of how the application service
can access data in Windows Azure SQL Database.
Scenario A, shown on the left, depicts a model for the time the application code locates
on the premises of a corporate data center, but the database resides in a Windows Azure
SQL database. An application code needs to use client libraries to access database(s) in a
Windows Azure SQL Database. Regardless of the client library chosen, data is transferred
using a tabular data stream (TDS) over a secure sockets layer (SSL).
Scenario B, shown on the right, depicts a model for the time the application code is
1http://www.msdn.microsoft.com/
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hosted in Windows Azure and the database locates in a Windows Azure SQL Database. The
application code in this scenario also needs to use client libraries to access the database(s)
in a Windows Azure SQL Database. There are many different types of applications that
can be hosted by Windows Azure platform (e.g., web applications or mobile applications).
The client premises in this scenario may represent an end user’s web browser, someone
who wants to access a web application, or a desktop or Silverlight application that uses the
beneﬁts of the WCF Data Services client to access data hosted in a Windows Azure SQL
Database via HTTP or HTTPS protocol.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we review the literature examining several areas related to our work. We
discuss privacy-preserving data publishing and privacy-preserving distributed data mining
researches. We also discuss solutions that enable integration of data along with preserving
data privacy. We then discuss the studied techniques of discovering web services for data
integration.
2.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP)
Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) provides methods and tools to publish data in
such a way that the published data remain useful while individual privacy is preserved.
The data publisher ﬁrst collects data from data owners and then publishes the collected
data to a data recipient, who might be a data miner who wants to conduct data mining
on the published data. The data mining task could be a simple or complex task, e.g.,
classiﬁcation or clustering analysis. For example, an organization collects information from
its employees and wants to publish an employee’s record to an external research center. In
this case, the organization is the data publisher, the employees are data owners, and the
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research center is the data recipient that wants to do the data mining task on the collected
data.
Data publishers can be classiﬁed into two models: untrusted vs. trusted [Geh06]. In the
untrusted model, the data publisher may attempt to obtain some sensitive information from
the data owner anonymously. Examples are various cryptographic solutions [YZW05],
anonymous communications [Cha81] [JJR02], and statistical methods [War65]. In the
trusted model, the data publisher is trusted and the data owners are willing to share their
sensitive information with the data publisher. In this thesis, we follow the trusted model for
the data publisher, and we call the data publishers DaaS providers.
In a practical data publishing situation, a data recipient could be an attacker. For ex-
ample, there might be untrustworthy people in the research center where a data publisher
wants to publish the employee’s information. The solution to this problem is very different
from cryptographic approaches, where authorized parties can only access published data.
The solution is to preserve both privacy and information utility in the anonymous data. In
our work, we take advantage of the LKC-privacy model to protect privacy and information
usefulness in our result.
For privacy-preserving relational data publishing, there is a large body of work on
anonymizing relational data, based on partitioned-based privacy models. As we discussed
earlier, K-anonymity [Sam01] [Swe02b], -Diversity [MKGV07], and Conﬁdence Bound-
ing [WFY07] [WFY05] are based on single QID-based approaches that suffer from the
curse of high dimensionality [Agg05], which would result in useless data for data mining.
In Chapter 3 we address this problem by utilizing a LKC-privacy model, which assumes
an adversary knows at most L values of QID attributes of any target victim V .
There are a few algorithms that have proposed solutions for classiﬁcation analysis [FWCY10].
The examples are [FWY05] [FWY07] [LDR06b] [Iye02] [WYC04]. In these works, re-
searchers have built a classiﬁer based on anonymized data, and then evaluated performance
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on the testing sets.
Other examples for privacy-preserving data publishing models are as follows: Sweeney
[Swe02a] uses generalization and suppression to achieve K-anonymity for dataﬂy sys-
tems. Preserving classiﬁcation information in K-anonymous data is studied in [FWY07]
[LDR06b]. Mohammed et al. [MFWH09] propose a top-down specialization algorithm to
securely integrate two vertically partitioned distributed data tables into a K-anonymous ta-
ble. Trojer et al. [TFH09] present a service-oriented architecture for achievingK-anonymity
in the privacy preserving data mashup scenario. Our work has a combination of a single
data source and integrated data source privacy levels. To preserve the privacy of data of
each DaaS provider, we utilize [MFHL09], which proposes a LKC-privacy model with an
anonymization algorithm to address the problem of high-dimensional anonymization. To
achieve LKC-anonymity for the integrated data we utilize [FTH+12], which provides a
service-oriented architecture for achieving LKC-anonymity in the privacy preserving data
mashup. We choose these two models for two reasons: a LKC-privacy model provides a
stronger privacy guarantee than K-anonymity with regard to linkage attacks, and to avoid
signiﬁcant information loss when K-anonymity is applied on high-dimensional data.
2.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Distributed Data Mining (PPDDM)
Privacy-Preserving Distributed Data Mining (PPDDM) presents a scenario for multiple
data providers who need to do data mining tasks on the integrated data in collaboration with
each other while preserving the privacy of individuals. For example, multiple organizations
want to build a classiﬁer on the salary of employees and publish that classiﬁer to the public,
but not the data itself.
Information integration has been an active area of database research [Jhi06] [Wie93]
[ERS99]. Two different methods are commonly used for releasing the result of data inte-
gration: data sharing and result sharing:
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PPDDM usually utilizes an assumption about data providers and cryptographic tech-
niques to achieve its goals. The assumption is that the data providers follow a non-colluding
semi-honest model [GMW87], where they do follow the protocol but may try to obtain
some additional information about the other providers from the collected data. The secure
protocols for constructing different data mining models based on cryptographic techniques
are known as Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [GMW87] [Gol04] [LP09] [Yao82].
It allows the sharing of the computed result (e.g., a classiﬁer) while it prohibits private data
from being shared. An example is the secure multiparty computation of classiﬁers [CKV+02]
[DZ02] [ZSR05].
On the other hand, privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) allows the publishing of
data records about individuals and not the data mining result sharing [FWCY10]. Agrawal
et al. [AES03] introduce the concept of minimal information sharing that allows only for
the metadata to be shared between data owners for the purpose of answering queries that
span multiple private databases. In the thesis, we utilize a privacy-preserving algorithm that
enables DaaS providers to share data, not only the data mining results. In many applications
data sharing gives greater ﬂexibility than does result sharing because the data recipients can
perform their required analysis [FWY07].
2.2.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Integration
Privacy-Preserving Data Integration [BGIC06] refers to solutions that enable integration of
data along with preserving the privacy of the data effectively, while data integration [DD99]
[Hul97] does not necessarily pay attention to the data privacy.
Bhowmick et al. [BGIC06] analyze the process of designing a privacy-preserving data
integration model and highlight the privacy and security challenges and concerns. They
preserve privacy by designing a query-rewriting module that receives and rewrites the XML
query and ﬁlters out the result instances that violate the access rules and data privacy.
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In [BGIC06], unlike in the data integration researches [DD99] [Hul97], privacy plays the
main role and avoids freely releasing data and schema of the sources.
Barhamgi et al. [BBG+11] propose a privacy preserving approach for mashing-up DaaS
web services. For protecting privacy, they proposed a model to rewrite queries based on
privacy policies deﬁned by data providers. Their privacy model contains a set of rules to
specify the recipients to whom data may be disclosed and the purposes that may be used for
data. This approach contains two rewriting phases, rewriting the query to satisfy the privacy
constraints and rewriting the modiﬁed query in terms of available web services. They
arrange services in the mashup by deﬁning a dependency graph, and then insert privacy
ﬁlters to generate the mashup data.
In contrast, we use PHDMashup as a secure protocol in order to integrate the data tables
of DaaS providers based on the request coming from a data consumer, while preserving
privacy of mashup data using LKC-privacy model.
2.2.4 Web Service Discovery for Data Integration
Web services discovery for data integration is an area related to our work. Benatallah et
al. [BHRT03] propose a solution to discover web services based on their capabilities. This
approach enables a combination of web services to fulﬁll a consumer’s request by making
a comparison between the request and available web services in the context of DAML-S
ontologies of services. In [PKPS02] Paolucci et al. show how to discover a web service
and make a semantic match between data providers’ advertisements and requests. Their
solution is based on DAML-S language for service description. Klusch et al. [KFS06] and
Vaculin et al. [VHNS08] extend the work of Paolucci et al. [PKPS02].
In [KFS06] Klusch et al. propose a OWL-S hybrid approach for approximate match-
making of requests and web services using approaches from information retrieval. In
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[VHNS08], Vaculin et al. propose an RDF-based framework for modeling and discov-
ering data providing services (DPS). They use a matchmaker component for service dis-
covery, and then require service requesters to interact with DPSs directly, while assuming
that there is no direct communication between different DPSs. Unlike their model, our
proposed framework assumes that a consumer’s data request could be best satisﬁed by
multiple DaaS providers, and therefore enables interactions between DaaS providers for




This thesis introduces a privacy-preserving framework for trading person-speciﬁc survey
data. The framework assumes three types of participants, namely DaaS providers, data
consumer, and mashup coordinator, as depicted in Figure 3. We assume that the data
being shared is in the form of a relational table that is vertically partitioned into sub-tables,
each of which is hosted by one DaaS provider. A data consumer submits a sequence of
data queries to a mashup coordinator in the platform, where each query consists of a data
mining task, the requested attributes, the required data quality, and the maximum bid price.
Since a single DaaS provider might not be able to provide all requested attributes, the
mashup coordinator is responsible for determining the group of DaaS providers that can
cover all the attributes while meeting the requested data quality and price. Finally, the
mashup coordinator has to return an anonymized data table that satisﬁes a given privacy
requirement that is agreed on by all the contributing DaaS providers. The rest of this section












Figure 3: The Framework
3.1 DaaS Providers
Let DP = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the group of registered DaaS providers in our framework. Each
provider Pi owns an attribute table in the form of TAi = (UID,EIDi, QIDi, Seni, Class),
where UID is a system-generated unique identiﬁer of a survey respondent, EIDi is a set
of explicit identiﬁers, QIDi is a set of quasi-identiﬁers, Seni is a set of sensitive attributes,
and Class is a target class attribute for classiﬁcation analysis. Explicit identiﬁers contain
information, such as name and SSN, that can explicitly identify an individual. They should
be removed before the data publishing. QID is a set of attributes, such as job, sex, and age,
that may identify a respondent if some combinations of QID values are speciﬁc enough.
They cannot be removed because they are useful for the data mining task. The sensitive
attribute Seni contains some sensitive information about the survey respondents, such as
diseases they might have. The target class attribute will be explained later in this section.
The DaaS providers want to sell the survey data in their attribute table for proﬁt, but
releasing the raw data may compromise the privacy of their survey respondents. Even if
attributes EIDi are removed, an adversary may still be able to launch effective privacy
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attacks on some target victims. In a common privacy attack called record linkage an adver-
sary attempts to utilize his background knowledge, represented by a combination of QID
values denoted by qid, of a target victim V , with the goal of identifying V ’s record in the
released data table T . This attack is effective if the number of records in T containing qid,
denoted by |T [qid]|, is small. Another common privacy attack is attribute linkage, in which
an adversary attempts to utilize the background knowledge of V ’s qid to infer V ’s sensitive
value s with a certain degree of conﬁdence. This attack is effective if the conﬁdence, which
is calculated by P (s|qid) = |T [qid∧s]||T [qid]| , is high.
Many privacy models [Swe02a] [Sam01] have been proposed in the last decade to
thwart these linkage attacks. In our proposed framework, we choose to impose LKC-
privacy [MFHL09] on the ﬁnal mashup data for two reasons. First, LKC-privacy was
speciﬁcally designed for preventing linkage attacks on high-dimensional data, i.e., data
with a large number of attributes. A data mining request can be complicated and re-
quires many attributes from different DaaS providers, often resulting in a high-dimensional
mashup table. Previous experimental results [MFHL09] have shown that enforcing other
traditional privacy models would result in poor data mining quality in the anonymized data.
Second, LKC-privacy is a generalized privacy model that covers K-anonymity [Swe02a],
conﬁdence bounding [WFY05], and -diversity [MKGV07]. Therefore, the DaaS providers,
if necessary, have the ﬂexibility to employ these traditional privacy models.
Deﬁnition 1 (LKC-Privacy [MFHL09]). Let L be the maximum number of QID values of
the adversary’s background knowledge on any participant in a data table T . Let S be a set
of sensitive values. A data table T satisﬁes LKC-privacy if, and only if, for any qid with
|qid| ≤ L,
1. |T [qid]| ≥ K, where K > 0 is a minimum anonymity threshold, and
2. ∀s ⊆ S, the probability P (s|qid) ≤ C, where 0 < C ≤ 1 is a maximum conﬁdence
threshold.
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LKC-privacy guarantees the probability of a successful record linkage to be ≤ 1/K
and the probability of a successful attribute linkage to be ≤ C. L, K, and C are DaaS
provider-speciﬁed privacy thresholds. Increasing K, increasing L, or decreasing C im-
poses a higher level of privacy protection, and vice versa. In general, imposing a higher
level of privacy would result in lower data quality, and, therefore, it would lower the data
mining value of the anonymized data. Thus, the DaaS providers would anonymize their
attribute table TAi with different combinations of L, K, and C, and advertise their prices in
a price table T Pi = (L,K,C,Quality, Price) containing different combinations of privacy
levels in terms of L, K, and C, with the corresponding data quality and price. The data
quality is an objective measure depending on the supported data mining task. For exam-
ple, the quality measure can be classiﬁcation accuracy for classiﬁcation analysis, and the
quality measure can be F-measure for cluster analysis. Our proposed platform is applicable
to any data mining task, provided there is a quality measure. In the implementation illus-
trated in the rest of this thesis, we assume that the DaaS providers support classiﬁcation
analysis, and the quality measure is classiﬁcation accuracy on the target attribute Class.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is only one Class attribute shared among
{TA1 , . . . , TAn }. Though LKC-privacy is chosen to be the privacy model in our implemen-
tation, our platform can adapt any privacy model provided there is a privacy parameter(s)
to adjust the privacy level.
Algorithm 1 presents a procedure called buildPT for constructing the price table. The
procedure takes in a set of LKC-privacy requirements. For each LKC-privacy require-
ment, the procedure (Line 2) utilizes an algorithm called Privacy Aware Information Shar-
ing (PAIS) [MFHL09] to anonymize the attribute table TAi . PAIS is a top-down special-
ization method for achieving LKC-privacy with the goal of maximizing the classiﬁcation
accuracy on the Class attribute. The resulting anonymized table is denoted by TA′i . Then,
the procedure (Line 3) employs the C4.5 decision tree classiﬁer [Qui93] to determine the
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Algorithm 1 buildPT: Price Table Construction
Input: attribute table TAi
Input: a set of LKC-privacy requirements PRi
Input: price per attribute PAi
Output: price table T Pi
1: for each combination {L,K,C} ∈ PRi do
2: TA
′
i ← PAIS(TAi , L,K,C);
3: Acc ← 100− C4.5(TA′i )
4: Price = Acc× PAi
5: T Pi ← insert(L,K,C,Acc, Price)
6: end for
7: return T Pi ;
classiﬁcation accuracy Acc of TA′i . The output of C4.5 classiﬁer is a classiﬁcation error
(CE) which is a positive number. Thus, Acc has range [0-100]. The advertised price in
Line 4 is determined by the price per attribute of provider Pi, discounted by the accuracy.
A new record with values L, K, C, Acc, and Price is then inserted into the price table T Pi
(Line 5).
We assume that DaaS providers follow the non-colluding semi-honest model [KMR],
meaning the providers follow the algorithm but are curious to derive sensitive information
from the results obtained from other providers, without colluding with other parties in the
platform. During the mashup process, the DaaS providers should not learn more informa-
tion from other providers other than what is in the ﬁnal mashup data.
3.2 Data Consumers
Data consumers are participants who want to perform some speciﬁc data analysis and
would like to purchase some survey data from the market by submitting a data request,
which can be as simple as a count query or as complex as a data mining operation, such
as a classiﬁcation analysis or a cluster analysis. In our proposed framework, a data request
is represented in the form of req = {Areq, Accreq, BPricereq}, where Areq is the set of








Seni)∪Class, Accreq is the required minimum classiﬁcation
accuracy, and BPricereq is the bid price for the requested data. Our model assumes that
any data consumer can be an adversary whose goal is to launch record and attribute linkage
attacks on the received data. Therefore, the ﬁnal mashup data must satisfy a given LKC-
privacy requirement that is agreed upon by all contributing DaaS providers.
3.3 Mashup Coordinator
A mashup coordinator is a mediator between data consumers and DaaS providers. Given
a data request req = {Areq, Accreq, BPricereq}, the objective of a mashup coordinator
is to coordinate one or multiple DaaS providers to generate a mashup table TM such
that TM contains all the requested attributes Areq, the total price of the mashup table
TPrice(TM) ≤ BPricereq, and the classiﬁcation accuracy on the ﬁnal mashup table
Acc(TM) ≥ Accreq. Finally, the mashup coordinator is responsible for sending the ﬁ-
nal mashup table TM to data consumers and distributing the revenue to the contributing
DaaS providers.
In case a mashup table TM satisﬁes Areq and Accreq but fails to satisfy TPrice(TM) ≤
BPricereq, a mashup coordinator should have the capability to make alternative recom-
mendations to the data consumers, such as increasing the bid priceBPricereq or decreasing
the minimum accuracy Accreq.
3.4 Problem Statement
The problem is deﬁned as follows. Given a person-speciﬁc relational database that is ver-
tically partitioned into n sub-databases, each of which is hosted by one DaaS provider
Pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the objective is to provide a framework for privacy-preserving DaaS
mashup, where the answer to a data consumer’s request req = {Areq, Accreq, BPricereq}
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is a mashup table TM such that (1) TM satisﬁes all requested attributes Areq, and the total
price TPrice(TM) and the classiﬁcation accuracy Acc(TM) of TM satisfy the bid price
BPreq and desired accuracy Accreq, respectively, (2) TM satisﬁes a given {L,K,C} pri-
vacy requirement agreed by the contributing DaaS providers, and (3) the integration process
between DaaS providers is secure.
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Chapter 4
The DaaS Mashup Framework
4.1 Solution Overview
The objective of our solution is to provide a market mashup framework with a Service-
oriented architecture (SOA) that enables DaaS providers to securely integrate their survey
data and generate an anonymized mashup table TM such that the privacy of the data is
preserved, while the request coming from the data consumer is satisﬁed.
The framework for answering a data consumer’s request consists of four steps:
Step 1 - Identify Contributing DaaS Providers. We introduce a greedy algorithm
DaaS Providers Selector (selectDaaSPs) that determines the group of DaaS providers
whose data satisfy all requested attributes such that the total cost is minimal.
Step 2 - Compute Total Price. The mashup coordinator executes a procedure called
Total Price Computation (compTPrice) to compute the total price of the mashup table TM .
Step 3 - Construct Mashup Table. To construct the ﬁnal mashup table TM and de-
termine its ﬁnal accuracy, the mashup coordinator executes a procedure called Mashup
Table Construction (buildTM). The latter uses the privacy-preserving PHDMashup algo-
rithm [FTH+12] to securely integrate and anonymize the attribute tables of contributing
DaaS providers. It also utilizes classiﬁer C4.5 to compute the ﬁnal classiﬁcation accuracy
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of TM .
Step 4 - Satisfy the Data Request. The mashup coordinator ensures that the requested
accuracy Accreq and the bid price BPricereq are fulﬁlled. Otherwise, the mashup coordi-
nator recommends alternative solutions with a higher price or lower accuracy.
4.2 The Architecture
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a pattern for business processes maintenance that
contains large distributed systems. SOA has several properties including services, interop-
erability, and loose coupling. A service is a discrete software module utilized for different
simple or complex functionalities. An enterprise service bus (ESB) enables the interoper-
ability for services among distributed systems and eases the distribution of processes over
multiple systems. Loose coupling minimizes the dependencies of system components and
improves scalability and fault tolerance of the system [Jos07]. The implemented architec-
ture of our framework is illustrated in Figure 4.
The proxy component contains a proxy manager that generates a proxy class based on
the WSDL description and exposes a programmatic interface based on the methods pub-
lished by the web service of the mashup coordinator. When the data consumer sends a
request, the coordinator invokes a method from the interface, where the method call is
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automatically converted (serialized) to a SOAP request SRequest by the proxy using XmlSe-
rializer class. The SRequest is then XML-formatted and transferred through the network.
Since SOAP web services utilize simple object access protocol to transmit data between
SOAP clients and SOAP APIs, our proxy manager uses the SOAP client to send SRequest
to the SOAP API of the mashup coordinator.
The mashup coordinator component contains three entities: SOAP API, mashup man-
ager, and SOAP client. The serialized request is automatically deserialized by XmlSerial-
izer class in order to extract the data when it reaches the SOAP API. The mashup manager
uses the extracted data to compute the contributing DaaS providers, calculate the total price,
construct the anonymized mashup table TM , and compute the ﬁnal accuracy of TM . The
mashup manager is also responsible for ensuring that the consumer’s request is fulﬁlled.
In case the request cannot be fulﬁlled, it recommends alternative solutions. The SOAP
client entity of the mashup coordinator component is used to communicate with the DaaS
provider components.
Each DaaS provider component consists of two entities: data manager and SOAP API.
The data manager receives requests from a mashup coordinator through the SOAP API,
and then deserializes the request and queries the data accordingly.
Once the ﬁnal anonymized mashup table TM has been constructed, the mashup man-
ager serializes the TM data, along with its accuracy and price values, and sends that as a
SOAP response back to the proxy via its SOAP API. The proxy component receives the
SOAP response SResponse through its SOAP client, then the proxy manager deserializes the
data and sends it back to the data consumer.
4.3 Identify Contributing DaaS Providers
When the mashup coordinator receives a consumer’s data request req, the ﬁrst task is to
identify one or more registered DaaS providers that can collectively fulﬁll all requested
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Algorithm 2 selectDaaSPs: DaaS Providers Selector
Input: requested attributes Areq
Input: registered DaaS providers DP
Output: contributing DaaS providers D
1: initially R = Areq and D = ∅ and Dˆ = DP
2: while R = ∅ do
3: select Pi ∈ Dˆ with the least price per attribute PAi
4: Mi ← {TAi ∩R}
5: if Mi = ∅ then
6: D ← (Pi,Mi)
7: R ← R \Mi
8: end if
9: Dˆ ← Dˆ \Pi
10: end while
11: return D;
attributes Areq such that the price of each attribute is the lowest possible price. We call
such a group contributing DaaS providers. The following is the formal deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 (Contributing DaaS Providers). Given a set of registered DaaS providers
DP and a set of requested attributes Areq, the contributing DaaS providers are the set
of providers D ⊆ DP such that:
1. ∀A ∈ Areq, ∃Pi ∈ D, where TAi contains A, and
2. Pj ∈ DP such that TAj contains A and the price per attribute PAj < PAi, where
PAj and PAi are the price per attribute for providers Pj and Pi, respectively.
In Algorithm 2, we introduce a greedy procedure DaaS Providers Selector (select-
DaaSPs) that enables the mashup coordinator to compute the contributing DaaS providers
for request req. This algorithm examines the set of attributes Areq and the price per at-
tribute PAi provided by each DaaS provider, and then identiﬁes for each requested attribute
the DaaS provider with the lowest price. The resulting D denotes a set of contributing
DaaS providers. Because there might be more than one set of contributing DaaS providers
that can satisfy req, selectDaaSPs is designed to ﬁnd only one set of contributing DaaS
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providers, and terminates once the set has been identiﬁed. SelectDaaSPs is a variation of
the weighted set cover problem [Chv79].
Initially, R is equal to the requested attributes Areq, and Dˆ is the set of all registered
DaaS providers (Line 1). In each iteration, the algorithm selects a provider Pi ∈ Dˆ whose
price per attribute PAi is the least among all providers in Dˆ (Line 3). If TAi , the attribute
table of Pi, contains some requested attributes Mi (Line 4), then the pair of DaaS provider
Pi along with Mi is added to D (Line 6), and Mi is then removed from R (Line 7). Pi is
also removed from Dˆ (Line 9), and a new iteration commences until R is empty.
Proposition 4.3.1. The cost of satisfying all requested attributes Areq is
∑
PAi × CAi,
where PAi is the price per attribute of provider Pi, and CAi is the number of covered
attributes by provider Pi.
The runtime complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(nlog m), where n is the number of re-
quested attributes |Areq| and m is the number of DaaS providers |Pi|. The main loop has
complexity O(n) because |Areq| = n. For selectDaaSPs, the major computational cost
comes from the selection of DaaS providers with the least price per attribute PAi. The
complexity of selecting DaaS providers with the least PAi is O(log m) using a priority
heap.
Example 6. In a data request req, let the set of requested attributes beAreq = {a1, a2, a3, a4,
a5, a6, a7, a8}. Let the attributes included in each attribute table of a DaaS provider be
as follows: TA1 = {a1}, TA2 = {a2}, TA3 = {a3, a4}, TA4 = {a5, a6, a7, a8}, TA5 =
{a1, a3, a5, a7}, TA6 = {a2, a4, a6, a8}. Let the price per attribute of each provider be:
PA1 = PA2 = 4, PA3 = 2, PA4 = 1, PA5 = PA6 = 3.




5 , and T
A
6 in the ﬁrst, second, third, and forth iter-
ation, respectively, and returns the set of contributing DaaS providersD = {(TA4 , {a5, a6, a7, a8}),
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Algorithm 3 compTPrice: Total Price Computation
Input: requested min. classiﬁcation accuracy Accreq
Input: contributing DaaS providers D
Output: total price TPrice(TM)
Output: privacy requirements L,K,C
1: Pi ← select a provider from D
2: D ← D \Pi
3: Acc ← findAcc(T Pi , Accreq)
4: (L,K,C, Pricei) ← selectLKCP (T Pi , Acc)
5: TPrice(TM) ← Pricei × CAi
6: for each Pj ∈ D : 1 ≤ j ≤ |D| do
7: if (L,K,C)  T Pj then
8: T Pj ← T Pj ∪ buildPT (TAj , {L,K,C}, PAj)
9: end if
10: TPrice(TM)←TPrice(TM)+selectPrice(L,K,C, T Pj ) ×CAj
11: end for
12: return TPrice(TM), L,K,C;
(TA3 , {a3, a4}), (TA5 , {a1}), (TA6 , {a2})}. The cost of satisfying Areq is (1× 4) + (2× 2) +
(3× 1) + (3× 1) = 14.
4.4 Compute Total Price
Once the set of contributing DaaS providers has been determined, the next step for the
mashup coordinator is to compute the total price of the mashup table TPrice(TM).
Given a minimum requested accuracyAccreq and the set of contributing DaaS providers
D determined in Section 4.3, the compTPrice algorithm randomly selects a provider Pi
from the set of contributing DaaS providers and removes it from D (Lines 1-2). Algorithm
ﬁndAcc is utilized to examine the price table T Pi and ﬁnd the smallest accuracy Acc that is
greater or equal to Accreq (Line 3). If such accuracy cannot be found, then ﬁndAcc selects
the highest accuracy available in T Pi . Next, algorithm selectLKCP selects from T
P
i (Line
4) the values L,K,C, and Pricei corresponding to Acc. Pricei is the price of one attribute
from DaaS provider Pi with regard to L,K,C values, whereas CAi = |Mi| is the number
of covered attributes by provider Pi (Line 5), where Mi is the set of intersecting attributes
34
between attribute table TAi and requested attributes Areq.
Because the LKC-privacy model requires one set of L,K,C values for anonymization,
for each remaining contributing DaaS provider Pj , algorithm compTPrice checks the price
table T Pj to ﬁnd the L,K,C values selected in Line 4. If a T
P
j does not contain the speciﬁed
L,K,C values (Line 7), then algorithm buildPT (Line 8) is invoked to generate a new row
in the T Pj table by utilizing given speciﬁed L,K,C values. Then for each T
P
j , selectPrice
identiﬁes the corresponding price value, multiplies it by CAj , and then adds it to the total
price (Line 10). The resulting TPrice(TM) is the total price of mashup table TM . This
algorithm outputs the total price TPrice(TM) and the set of L,K,C values (Line 12).
4.5 Construct Mashup table TM
To construct the mashup table TM , the mashup coordinator utilizes a secure algorithm
called Privacy-Preserving High-Dimensional Data Mashup (PHDMashup) [FTH+12]. In
this section, we ﬁrst introduce the PHDMashup algorithm. We then show how to con-
struct the anonymized mashup table TM that satisﬁes the requested attributes of the data
consumer, and we compute its ﬁnal accuracy.
Let D = {P1, . . . , Pm} be a set of contributing DaaS providers, where each provider
Pi ∈ D : 1 ≤ i ≤ m owns a person-speciﬁc data table Ti. The target attribute Class for
classiﬁcation analysis is shared among all tables. Privacy-Preserving High-Dimensional
Data Mashup (PHDMashup) is a data integration protocol that securely integrates the data
tables of any set of DaaS providers with this setting and ensures that the ﬁnal mashup
table satisﬁes a speciﬁed LKC-privacy requirement with the goal of maximizing the data
quality for classiﬁcation analysis. PHDMashup serves as the core data mashup protocol in
our framework. Yet, we would like to emphasize that Fung et al. [FTH+12] did not present
a DaaS framework on how to identify the appropriate combination of DaaS providers with
consideration of price and data quality requirements, which is a main contribution of this
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thesis.
Algorithm 4 buildTM: Mashup Table Construction
Input: contributing DaaS providers D
Input: privacy requirements L,K,C
Output: mashup table TM
Output: accuracy of mashup table Acc(TM)
1: TM ← PHDMashup(D, L,K,C)
2: Acc(TM) ← 100− C4.5(D, L,K,C)
3: return TM , Acc(TM);
Procedure buildTM presented in Algorithm 4 is executed by the mashup coordinator for
the purpose of computing mashup table TM and determining its accuracy Acc(TM). Given
a set of contributing DaaS providers D and privacy requirements L,K,C, the mashup co-
ordinator runs the PHDMashup algorithm (Line 1) in order to integrate and anonymize the
raw data of contributing DaaS providers D and generates a mashup table TM that satisﬁes
the given privacy requirements L,K,C. The PHDMashup algorithm preserves the privacy
of every data provider by guaranteeing the mashup coordinator does not gain more infor-
mation than the ﬁnal mashup TM gives. The classiﬁer C4.5 computes the classiﬁcation
error for the anonymized mashup table TM and privacy requirements L,K,C (Line 2),
where the resulting value Acc(TM) is the classiﬁcation accuracy of the mashup table TM .
Procedure buildTM returns both the mashup table TM and its accuracy Acc(TM) (Line 3).
4.6 Request Satisfaction
Having constructed the mashup table TM and determined its accuracy Acc(TM) and price
TPrice(TM), the mashup coordinator must ensure the requested accuracy Accreq and the
bid price BPricereq are fulﬁlled such that TPrice(TM) ≤ BPricereq and Acc(TM) ≥
Accreq. If Accreq and BPricereq are not fulﬁlled, the mashup coordinator constructs an-
other mashup table TM and veriﬁes the fulﬁllment again. If no TM table can fulﬁll Accreq
and BPricereq simultaneously, the mashup coordinator recommends alternative solutions
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Figure 5: Data Request Satisfaction
The goal of the mashup coordinator is to ﬁnd the mashup table TM whose price TPrice(TM)
is the lowest possible among all mashup tables satisfying requested attributes Areq. As il-
lustrated in Section 3.1, Price = Acc× PAi for any privacy requirements L,K,C, where
PAi is the price per attribute of provider Pi. Therefore, in order for TPrice(TM) to be the
lowest possible, Acc(TM) must be as close as possible to Accreq. The mashup coordinator
iteratively executes compTPrice and buildTM procedures to identify a mashup table TM
such that its accuracy Acc(TM) is closest to Accreq and greater than or equal to Accreq.
If no lower accuracy can be found in the price table T Pi of the ﬁrst selected contributing
DaaS provider Pi, but both Accreq and BPricereq are satisﬁed, then the mashup coordi-
nator returns the anonymized mashup table TM with its total price TPrice(TM) and ﬁnal
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accuracy Acc(TM) to the data consumer.
The mashup coordinator might recommend alternative solutions ifAccreq andBPricereq
could not be mutually fulﬁlled. For instance, for any mashup table TM that satisﬁes all
requested attributes Areq, if Acc(TM) is always less than Accreq, then the mashup coordi-
nator suggests to the data consumer the mashup table TM whose accuracy Acc(TM) is the






We implemented our proposed architecture in Microsoft Windows Azure1, a cloud-based
computing platform. Platform-as-a-service (PaaS) [MG11] is a class of cloud comput-
ing services that provides a computing platform, including operating systems, databases,
and web servers, as a service to the users. PaaS offers large storage, high reliability, and
easy maintenance. Our developed web services are deployed in Microsoft Windows Azure
Cloud Services together with Microsoft SQL Azure as the storage for DaaS providers in
a distributed environment. Our works are applicable to other PaaS providers who support
similar services. DaaS providers are distributed in a cloud environment, each of which is
implemented on a Windows Server 2008 R2 running on AMD OpteronTM Processor 4171
HE@2.09 GHz with 1.75 GB RAM, and each hosts an SQL Azure database. The mashup
coordinator is implemented as a web service, whereas the data consumer is implemented
as a web client that interacts with the mashup coordinator via HTTP protocol.
We utilize a real-life adult data set [BL13] in our experiments to illustrate the per-
formance of our proposed framework. The adult data set contains 45,222 census records
1http://www.microsoft.com/azure/
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consisting of eight categorical attributes, six numerical attributes, and a class attribute rev-
enue with two levels, ≤ 50K or > 50K. We perform our experiments with the assumption
of having three DaaS providers in the system. Thus, the adult data is vertically partitioned
into three overlapping partitions, each of which contains 6 attributes. The partitions are
used to construct the attribute tables TA1 , T
A
2 , and T
A
3 corresponding to providers P1, P2,
and P3, respectively.
Table 6 shows the attributes of each data provider. Each table contains 6 attributes. The
common attributes are coloured in gray. The tables share a common UID for joining. The
sensitive attribute in each table is Marital-Status, with two values: Divorced and Separated.
The remaining 6 attributes in each table are the QID attributes. The taxonomy trees of all
categorical attributes can be found in [FWY07].
# Leaves # Leaves # Leaves # Leaves
Age numerical
Final-weight categorical 7 4
Education-Num categorical 14 3
WorkClass 8 5 categorical 6 3
Education 16 5 categorical 5 3
Marital-Status 7 4 categorical 2 2



























Table 6: Attributes of Three DaaS Providers
The objective of our experiments is to evaluate the performance of the proposed market
framework for privacy-preserving DaaS mashup. We ﬁrst study the impact on the revenue
of each data provider that results from enforcing various LKC-privacy requirements by
varying the thresholds of maximum adversary’s knowledge L, minimum anonymity K,
and maximum conﬁdence C. Next, we evaluate the efﬁciency of our solution and show
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that it is efﬁcient with regard to the number of requested attributes |Areq|, classiﬁcation
analysis Accreq, and bid price BPricereq.
5.2 Impact of Privacy Requirements on Revenue
To evaluate the impact ofLKC-privacy requirements on the revenue of each DaaS provider,
we use all 45,222 records of each data for anonymization, build classiﬁer C4.5 on 2/3 of
the anonymized records as the training set, measure the classiﬁcation error on 1/3 of the
anonymized records as the testing set, determine the ﬁnal classiﬁcation accuracy FAcc, and
then compute the revenue of each DaaS provider Pi with respect to its price per attribute
PAi.
Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrates the impact of L,K,C thresholds on the
revenue of each DaaS provider. The data providers can use these results as a guideline to

















Figure 6: Impacts of Threshold L on DaaS Provider’s Revenue
Figure 6 depicts the effect of threshold L. We observe that the revenue of each DaaS
provider is insensitive to threshold L when L >= 2.
Figure 7 depicts the effect of threshold K. The revenue of P1 and P3 is mainly unaf-
fected by the change of value of K. However, the increase of the value of K might neg-
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Figure 7: Impacts of Threshold K on DaaS Provider’s Revenue
by 5% (from $892 to $844) when K increased from 200 to 300. The reason for this drop
is that when the specialization level K is increased to 300, the number of “good" attributes


















Figure 8: Impacts of Threshold C on DaaS Provider’s Revenue
Figure 8 depicts that revenue is insensitive to the increase in the value of conﬁdence
threshold C. Consequently, we conclude that the primary privacy parameter that has a
major impact on the revenue of a DaaS provider in our framework is the specialization pa-
rameter K.
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5.3 Efﬁciency and Scalability
One major contribution of our work is the development of an efﬁcient and scalable market
framework for privacy-preserving DaaS mashup. The runtime complexity of our approach
is dominated by the number of requested attributes |Areq| in the consumer’s data request
req, the classiﬁcation accuracy Accreq, and the bid price BPricereq. Therefore, we study
the runtime under different numbers of requested attributes Areq and different values of the
pair (Accreq, BPricereq).
Efﬁciency. We split the total runtime of our approach into three major phases: Data Pre-
Processing, corresponding to Algorithm 1; Contributing DaaS Providers, corresponding
to Algorithm 2; and Final Mashup TM , corresponding to Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4.
Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 depict the runtime of each phase when the number of
requested attributes Areq ranges between 4 and 13 attributes, with three different values of
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Figure 9: Efﬁciency (Accreq = 70, BPricereq = 3000)
Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 depict the runtime of each phase when the classiﬁca-
tion accuracy and bid price pair (Accreq, BPricereq) is equal to (70%,$3,000), (80%,$9,000),
and (90%,$15,000), respectively. We observe that the runtime of the Data Pre-Processing






4 7 10 13
Data Pre-Processing Contributing DaaS Providers
Final Mashup T^M Total








Final Mashup TM 
Figure 10: Efﬁciency (Accreq = 80, BPricereq = 9000)
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Figure 11: Efﬁciency (Accreq = 90, BPricereq = 15000)
Accreq, and BPricereq. On the other hand, when |Areq| ≥ 7, the runtime of the Final
Mashup TM phase grows linearly as the number of requested attributes |Areq| increases.
We also observe that the runtime of the Final Mashup TM phase dominates the total run-
time of our approach. This is due to the fact that sometimes the integration procedure
buildTM in Algorithm 4 might be executed more than once to satisfy the consumer’s re-
quest with regard to the bid price and data utility level. Note that in Figure 11, the total
runtime when |Areq| = 13 is 12 sec, in contrast to 75 sec in Figure 9 and 95 sec in Figure 10.
This is because Accreq = 90% and BPricereq = $15, 000 are both beyond the threshold
of accuracy and price in the DaaS providers’ price tables. In this case algorithm 3 selects
the highest accuracy from the data providers’ price tables and computes the corresponding
total cost while avoiding the need to ﬁnd higher or lower accuracies, which reduces the
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number of times Algorithm 4 needs to run. Consequently, we conclude that our proposed
solution is efﬁcient with regard to the number of requested attributes |Areq|, classiﬁcation
analysis Accreq, and bid price BPricereq.
Scalability. We evaluate the scalability of our algorithm with respect to data volume by
blowing up the size of the Adult data set. First, we combined the training and testing sets,
giving 45,222 records. For each original record r in the integrated set, we created α − 1
"variations" of r, where α > 1 is the blowup scale.
For scalability evaluation in order to show the sensitivity to the change of requested
accuracy and bid price values, we consider three different combinations for requested ac-
curacy Accreq and requested price BPricereq according to the price table of data providers.
Each line in Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14 illustrates the total runtime of our solution
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Figure 12: Scalability (Accreq = 70, BPricereq = 3000)
Figure 12 depicts the total runtime of our algorithm from 200,000 to 1 million records
for Accreq = 70 and BPricereq = 3000. The total runtime of answering consumer’s re-
quest with consideration to the consumer’s data attribute requirement for 1 million records
is 146s when the number of requested attributes |Areq| = 5, 230s when the number of re-
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Figure 13: Scalability (Accreq = 80, BPricereq = 9000)
Figure 13 depicts the total runtime of our algorithm from 200,000 to 1 million records
for Accreq = 80 and BPricereq = 9000. The total runtime of answering consumer’s re-
quest with consideration to the consumer’s data attribute requirement for 1 million records
is 163s when the number of requested attributes |Areq| = 5, 267s when the number of re-
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Figure 14: Scalability (Accreq = 90, BPricereq = 15000)
Figure 14 depicts the total runtime of our algorithm from 200,000 to 1 million records
for Accreq = 90 and BPricereq = 15000. The total runtime of answering consumer’s re-
quest with consideration to the consumer’s data attribute requirement for 1 million records
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is 134s when the number of requested attributes |Areq| = 5, 190s when the number of re-
quested attributes |Areq| = 9, and 227s when the number of requested attributes |Areq| =
13.
The total runtime in Figure 14 is less than the total runtime in Figure 12 and the total
runtime in Figure 13 because Accreq and BPricereq in Figure 14 go beyond the accuracy
threshold and prices speciﬁed in the providers’ price tables.
The runtime of all three ﬁgures scale linearly with respect to the data set’s size. The
experimental results on real-life data sets suggest that our algorithm is scalable with respect





In this thesis we implemented a DaaS mashup cloud-based framework for the online mar-
ket and generalized the privacy and information requirements to the problem of a privacy-
preserving DaaS mashup with the objective of generating anonymous answers to a variety
of data mining queries requested by consumers. We propose a solution for secure collabo-
ration between the most suitable set of DaaS providers, while achieving LKC-privacy on
the mashup data without revealing more detailed information in the process. Our proposed
solution differs from the classic secure multiparty computation due to the fact that we allow
data sharing instead of data mining result sharing. Data sharing provides the data recipient
greater ﬂexibility to perform different data analysis tasks.
In this chapter, we summarize the contributions, followed by a description of future
research directions.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
First, we present a greedy algorithm for secure collaboration between the most suitable set
of DaaS providers, while achieving LKC-privacy on the mashup data without revealing
more detailed information in the process. The proposed solution identiﬁes the combination
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of contributing DaaS providers whose data can fulﬁll the data privacy, data quality, and bid
price requirements.
Second, we propose a solution and implement a DaaS mashup cloud-based framework
to mash-up private data from distributed DaaS providers to satisfy a consumer’s request,
while preserving both data privacy and data mining quality of the underlying data. We
also consider alternative solutions for cases where no providers can satisfy a consumer’s
request. In these cases, the nearest suggestions to the consumer’s needs will be offered.
Finally, we conduct extensive experimental study on a real-life data set and examine the
impact of employing different privacy thresholds on the revenue of each DaaS provider. We
then demonstrate that our approach is efﬁcient and scalable in terms of processing various
sizes of queries with regard to data quality and bid price. Next, we show that our solution
is highly scalable for large scaled data sets.
6.2 Future Work
For our future work, we identify two potential research directions:
First, in the greedy algorithm proposed in this thesis we presented a solution to output
one set of contributing DaaS providers in terms of price. It implies that the identiﬁed set of
DaaS providers is the cheapest set of providers whose data can satisfy data privacy and data
quality as well as bid price requirements. However, this solution provides an answer which
is be on behalf of the user in terms of price, but it does not identify the minimum number
of DaaS providers whose data can fulﬁll a consumer’s request. One possible direction for
future work is to modify the algorithm in a way that the output is the smallest number of
DaaS providers that can satisfy the query such that the total cost is minimal.
Second, in this thesis, we utilize the price per attribute values of each DaaS provider
in the greedy algorithm to ﬁnd a set of contributing DaaS providers whose data can satisfy
the request with minimum cost. Our solution selects a DaaS provider from that set and
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tries to satisfy the requested accuracy and bid price. However, our solution determines the
lowest price needed to answer a request. It would be interesting to study how price and
accuracy can collaborate in one greedy algorithm to propose a privacy-preserving DaaS
mashup framework that can fulﬁll a consumer’s request. This feature allows the consumer
to select a better total price for the request.
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Figure 4: Framework for Privacy-Preserving Data-as-a-Service Mashups: Implementation
Architecture
of TM .
Step 4 - Satisfy the Data Request. The mashup coordinator ensures that the requested
accuracy Accreq and the bid price BPricereq are fulﬁlled. Otherwise, the mashup coordi-
nator recommends alternative solutions with a higher price or lower accuracy.
4.2 The Architecture
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a pattern for business processes maintenance that
contains large distributed systems. SOA has several properties including services, interop-
erability, and loose coupling. A service is a discrete software module utilized for different
simple or complex functionalities. An enterprise service bus (ESB) enables the interoper-
ability for services among distributed systems and eases the distribution of processes over
multiple systems. Loose coupling minimizes the dependencies of system components and
improves scalability and fault tolerance of the system [Jos07]. The implemented architec-
ture of our framework is illustrated in Figure 4.
The proxy component contains a proxy manager that generates a proxy class based on
the WSDL description and exposes a programmatic interface based on the methods pub-
lished by the web service of the mashup coordinator. When the data consumer sends a
request, the coordinator invokes a method from the interface, where the method call is
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Figure 5: Data Request Satisfaction
The goal of the mashup coordinator is to ﬁnd the mashup table TM whose price TPrice(TM)
is the lowest possible among all mashup tables satisfying requested attributes Areq. As il-
lustrated in Section 3.1, Price = Acc× PAi for any privacy requirements L,K,C, where
PAi is the price per attribute of provider Pi. Therefore, in order for TPrice(TM) to be the
lowest possible, Acc(TM) must be as close as possible to Accreq. The mashup coordinator
iteratively executes compTPrice and buildTM procedures to identify a mashup table TM
such that its accuracy Acc(TM) is closest to Accreq and greater than or equal to Accreq.
If no lower accuracy can be found in the price table T Pi of the ﬁrst selected contributing
DaaS provider Pi, but both Accreq and BPricereq are satisﬁed, then the mashup coordi-
nator returns the anonymized mashup table TM with its total price TPrice(TM) and ﬁnal
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